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ADMIRALTY - AcTIONs AGAINST SHIPOWNERS FOR Loss OF CARGO
- BuRDEN oF PROOF OF SEAWORTHINESS - A recent decision 1 of the
United States Supreme Court has laid to rest a number of complex·
problems involved in allocating the burden of proving seaworthiness
between shipowners and injured cargo owners. While these general
problems are by no means peculiar to maritime law, one plausible explanation for their unusual importance here might be found in the inherent difficulty which confronts the fact-finder when he attempts to
accumulate information regarding accidents at sea. Fathoms of water
1 Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank Barge Corp., 314 U.S. 104,
62 S. Ct. 156 (1941). The case is noted in 30 GEO. L. J. 400 (1942); 42 CoL.
L. REv. 699 (1942); 16 TULANE L. REV. 464 (1942); 27 VA. L. REV. 1078
(1941).
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may separate him from his evidence, and even where the source of
injury is more accessible, the complex science of navigation and ship
construction make impossible, in many instances, a true account of the
cau~e. Whether this be the only reason or not, the fact remains that
numerous cases reach issue on the sole question of who should sustain
the burden of proof. It is this fact which renders desirable a re-examination of the doctrines under which the courts are now likely to distribute the burden of proving seaworthiness.
I.

In every contract for the carriage of goods- by sea, there is an implied warranty on the part of the shipowner that his vessel is seaworthy
for that particular voyage and for the cargo carried.2 His assurances in
this respect are implied by law and made absolute where no express
contract is negotiated to modify his obligations.8 If there be a defect ·
which renders the ship unseaworthy, although latent and unknown to
the owner, he is not excused; nor is he relieved from liability by showing conclusively that he was free from negligence in his efforts to provide a seaworthy ship.4 The requirement is strict, even harsh, yet
courts feeling as they do that public policy necessitates a rigid compul-:
sion on owners, are reluctant to relax it in any degree.
Seaworthiness has been defined as the duty "to provide a: seaworthy
vessel, tight and staunch, and well furnished with suitable tackle, sails,
or motive power, as the case may be, and furniture necessary for the
2 "The warranty of seaworthiness for the voyage must be satisfied at the time of
sailing with the cargo." CARVER, CARRIAGE OF Goons BY SEA, 8th ed., 31 (1938).
"This warranty is not limited to the mere fitness to encounter sea perils. If the ship
is to carry goods of a particular kind, the implied warranty requires that the ship and
'her equipment be fit for the purpose of safely carrying those goods to their destination." Id. 28. The Fort Gaines, (D. C. Md. 1927) 21 F. (2d) 865; The Steel
Navigator, (C. C. A. 2d, 1928) 23 F. (2d) 590; The Edwin I. Morrison, 153 U.S.
199, 14 S. Ct. 823 (1894).
8 The Glenfruin, IO Prob. Div. 103 (1885); Lyon v. Mells, 5 East 428, 102
Eng. Rep. 1134 (1804); Work v. Leathers, 97 U.S. 379 (1878); The G. R. Crowe,
(D. C. N. Y. 1922) 287 F. 426. Both in England and in the United States owners
began to stipulate against.liability to such an extent that the Harter Act resulted. 'The
Delaware, 161 ·u. S. 459, 16 S. Ct. 516 (1896); The Irrawaddy, 171 U.S. 187, 18
S. Ct. 831 (1898).
4 Under the Harter Act, 27 Stat. L. 445 (1893), 46 U.S. C. (1940), §§
190-195, and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (the Hague rules), 49 Stat. L. 1207
(1936), 46 U.S. C. (1940), §§ 1300-1315, however, this strict liability has been
reduced, under certain conditions, to a requirement of "due care." See The Southwark, 191 U.S. 1, 24 S. Ct. 1 (1903); The Fort Gaines, (D. C. Md. 1927) 21
F. (2d) 865.
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voyage." 5 In the language of Justice Gray, "The test of seaworthiness
is whether the vessel is reasonably fit to carry the cargo which she has
undertaken to transport." 6 It is apparent from the general nature of
this undertaking that the question whether a vessel is seaworthy will
depend for its answer upon the particular facts of each case.7 "A vessel
may be· perfectly seaworthy for cargo-carrying purposes around the
harbor, and not be seaworthy for oceanic carriage; and she may be sea- ·
'worthy for the carriage of a load of lumber, and not seaworthy for a
load of steel rails." 8 The general nature of this standard presents
counsel with another serious difficulty when the burden of proof lies
upon him.
·
The word "warranty," as used in connection with seaworthiness,
has a twofold meaning in admiralty. In one sense it is used to mean a
promise, the breach of which will entitle the injured party to a suit for
damages,9 but it also means that the promise is so essential that performance of it is a condition precedent to the obligation of the other
party.10 If a vessel is warranted to be seaworthy and the vessel is not
in fact seaworthy the shipper is free, as in any other breach of a material promise, to rescind or repudiate the transaction or sue for breach of
promise.11
5 The Propeller Niagara v. Cordes, 21 How. (62 U.S.) 7 at 23 (1858). "But
the duty to supply a seaworthy ship is not equivalent to a duty to provide one that is
perfect, and such as cannot break down except under extraordinary peril. What •is
meant is that she must have that degree of fitness which an ordinary careful and
prudent owner would require his vessel to have at the commencement of her
voyage. . . ." CARVER, CARRIAGE OF Goons BY SEA, 8th ed., 25 (1938).
6 The Silvia, 171 U.S. 462 at 464, 19 S. Ct. 7 (1898); The Addison E •• Bullard, (C. C. A. 2d, 1923) 287 F. 674; The Wildcroft, 201 U.S. 378, 26 S. Ct.
467 (1906).
1 "It can never be settled by positive rules of law how far this obligation of seaworthiness extends in any particular case, for the reason that improvements and
changes in the means and modes of navigation frequently require new implements, or
new forms of old ones; and these, though not necessary at first, become so when there
is an established usage that all ships of a certain quality, or those to be sent on certain
voyages or used for certain purposes, shall have them." 2 BoUVIER, I.Aw DICTIONARY,
Rawle ed., 3028 (1914).
8 The Sagamore, (C. C. A. 2d, 1924) 300 F. 701 at 704, quoted in ROBINSON,
ADMIRALTY 513 (1939).
9 Ollive v. Booker, I Ex. 416, 154 Eng. Rep. 177 (1847); Davison v. Von
Lingen, I 13 U.S. 40, 5 S. Ct. 346 (1885). The matter is discussed at some length
in 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed.,§ 1080 (1936). See also 23 VA. L. REv. 2u
(1936).
10 Norrington v. Wright, 115 U.S. 188, 6 S. Ct. 12 (1885); RoBINSoN,
ADMIRALTY 605 (1939).
11 1WILLISTON, SALES, 2d ed., 333 (1924).
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z.
The recent decision in Commercial Molasses Corporation v. New
York Tank Barge Corporation 12 clarifies considerably the earlier decisions emanating from federal courts on the question of where the burden of proving seaworthiness ought to lie. The issue originated
through an attempt by the respondent, as chartered owner of a private
carrier, to limit its liability for damages resulting from the sinking of
its barge in New York harbor. The libellant had a charter party expressly warranting the fitness of the vessel for carrying the molasses.
A similar warranty was also implied by law. The cause of the accident
was inexplicable. "The barge sank in smooth water, without contact
with any other vessel or external object to account for the sinking."
After reviewing the evidence carefully, the trial judge found as a fact
that upon all the evidence "the cause of the accident has been left in
doubt." The petitioner concluded from this finding that the respondent
was chargeable upon its warranty of seaworthiness by reason of its
failure to overcome the presumption of unseaworthiness arising from
the unexplained sinking. The respondent, reaching a contrary conclusion, reasoned that the presumption of unseaworthiness did not survive the further proof which left in doubt the cause of the loss; that
the petitioner had failed, therefore, to sustain its burden. In a comprehensive opinion upholding the respondent's contentions, the Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Stone, reviewed the
pertinent law involved by emphasizing that the issue necessarily turned
upon ,the distinction between a common and a private carrier. The
Court uses this language:
''With respect to the burden of proof, this case is to be distinguished from those in which the burden of proving seaworthiness rests upon the vessel when it is a common carrier or
has assumed the obligation of a common carrier. The present
contract of affreightment was for private carriers in New York
harbor ... and thus gave to respondent the status of a bailee for
hire of the molasses." 18
·

Coggs v. Bernard,14 more than two centuries ago, established the
distinction between a common and a private carrier by land; yet, even
prior to that time, the doctrine had been applied to carriers by sea.15
The doctrine requires no reiteration here except to point out that a private carrier, whether with or ·without reward, is strictly a bailee aIJ.d
314 u. s. 104, 62 s. Ct. 156 (IC)41).
Id., 314 U.S. at 108.
14 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (1703).
15 Mors v. Slew, 2 Keb. 866, 3 Keb. 72, II2, 135, 84 Eng. Rep. 548, 601,
624, 638 (1671).
12
18
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nothing more, and questions as to his liability are to be determined by
the ordinary rules which govern the responsibilities of bailees. 1 ° Common carriers stand upon an entirely different footing, and when questions as to their liability arise they must be decided upon principles
peculiarly applicable to their duties as insurer.17 The difference between the two seems to be this: a shipowner or charterer is deemed to
be a common carrier only when he represents himself as willing to accept the goods of any person who may wish to employ his services.
The "general ship," as the common carrier by water is sometimes
called, takes up her cargo from various persons, and may solicit passenger patronage. The private carrier, on the other hand, is distinguished
from the general ship by the fact that the shipper engages the whole
of the,ship's capacity.18 At least one author has suggested that where
part· of a ship is chartered for private use, it is a common carrier only
in respect of such other portions as are "put on the berth" as a general
ship, 19 but apparently this has not been widely accepted, and, indeed,
it would appear inconsistent with the above definition.
It is commonly said that in order to relieve himself from liability
for failure to carry goods safely, the common carrier must show affirmatively that the cause of the loss was included within one of the
narrowly restricted exceptions in the bill of lading,2° and not to any
16

Southern Ry. v. Prescott, 240 U. S. 632, 36 S. Ct. 469 (1916); Kohlsaat v.
Parkersburg & Marietta Sand Co., (C. C. A. 4th, I<j20) 266 F. 283; Alpine Forwarding Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) 60 F. (2d) 734; Gerhard
& Hey v. Cattaraugus Tanning Co., 241 N. Y. 413, 150 N. E. 500 (1926); In re
Steamship Company Norden, (D. C. Md. 1925) 6 F. (2d) 883.
17
Schnell v. The Vallescura, 293 U.S. 296, 55 S. Ct. 194 (1934); The Edwin
I. Morrison, 153 U.S. 199, 143 S. Ct. 823 (1894). The "insurer's" liability has
been cut down considerably. New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants Bank,
6 How. (47 U.S.) 344 (1848); The Victory, 168 U.S. 410, 18 S. Ct. 149 (1897);
The Queen of the Pacific, 180 U.S. 49, 21 S. Ct. 278 (1901); ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY 495 (1939).
18
The Fri, (C. C. A. 2d, 1907) 154 F. 333; The G. R. Crowe, (C. C. A. 2d,
1923) 294 F. 506; The Wildenfels, (C. C. A. 2d, 1908) 161 F. 864; The C. R.
Sheffer, (C. C. A. 2d, 1918) 249 F. 600; The Lyra, (C. C. A. 9th, 1919) 255 F.
667; In re Steam.ship Company Norden, (D. C. Md. 1925) 6 F. (2d) 883.
19
PAYNE, CARRIAGE OF GooDs BY SEA, 4th ed., 35 (1938).
20
Perhaps the most common exception found in bills-of-lading is that excusing
the shipowner for damage due to "perils of the sea." Every injury to a cargo by sea
water is not a "peril of the sea." Schnell v. The V allescura, 293 U. S. 296, 5 5 S. Ct.
194 (1934); The Folmina, 212 U.S. 354, 29 S. Ct. 363 (1909). The carrier
generally has the burden of proof in showing a connection between damages by sea
water and the exception against sea perils. The Henry B. Hyde, (C. C. A. 9th, 1898)
90 F. u4; The Lennox, (D. C. N. Y. 1898) 90 F. 308; The Patria, (C. C. A. 2d,
1904) 132 F. 971. "It is commonly said that when the carrier succeeds in establishing
that the injury is from an excepted cause, the burden is then on the shipper to show
that that cause would not have produced the injury but for the carrier's negligence in
failing to guard against it." Schnell v. Vallescura, supra, 293 U.S. at 304-305.
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breach of his duty to furnish a seaworthy vessel. That is to say, the
cargo owner need only prove his loss. The burden is then upon the
carrier to explain the circumstances under which that loss occurred.
The burden of proof in this sense remains, where the law has placed it,
upon the carrier until he produces evidence of sufficient probative force
to convince the trier of fact that the loss is attributable to some cause
excepted by common law, by statute or by contract. The private
carrier, however, who has not undertaken such strict obligations, is in
no different position from the ordinary bailee. Therefore, the burden
of proof will not be cast upon the shipowner, but upon the party who
must assert unseaworthiness as the ground of the recovery which he
seeks.21 In the Commercial Molasses Corporation case, for example,
the petitioner alleged that respondent had breached its warranty of
seaworthiness with the resultant loss of the petitioner's cargo of molasses. The burden lies on the petitioner, therefore, to show affirmatively
that the vessel was not in fact seaworthy and that this was the proximate cause of the injury.22

3.
The basic principles adopted in the Commercial Molasses Corporation decision seem to be in tune with the general law concerning carriers,23 but it is manifest, in spite of the Court's assertion to the contrary, that in order to achieve this consistency it was forced to make a
definite departure from earlier federal court precedent.24 Prior to I 900
the cases, both of the Supreme Court and of the lower federal courts,
are almost devoid of any marked development or change in these principles, it being generally assumed during that time that the burden of
21 Southern Ry. v. Prescott, 240 U. S. 632, 36 S. Ct. 469 (1916); Kohlsaat v.
Parkersburg & Marietta Sand Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1920) 266 F. 283; The Transit
(C. C. A. 3d, 1918) 250 F. 71; In re Steamship Company Norden, (D. C. Md.
1925) 6 F. (2d) 883; Delaware Dredging Co. v. Graham, (D. C. Pa. 1930) 43 F.
(2d) 852; Alpine Forwarding Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) 60 F.
(2d) 734; Gerhard & Hey v. Cattaraugus Tanning Co., 241 N. Y. 413, 150 N. E.
500 (1926). See also STORY, BAILMENTS, 8th ed.,§§ 501, 504, 410, 410a (1870);
9,WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed.,§ 2508 (1940).
22 Since the. carrier's liability ·is greater for failure to supply a seaworthy vessel
than for errors in navigation, it is important to distinguish beween the two. There
are many close decisions. The Silvia, 171 U. S. 462, IO S. Ct. 7 (1898).
23 Beale, "The Carrier's Liability: Its History," II HARV. L. REv. 158 (1897);
Arterburn, "The Early Liability of a Bailee,'' 25 MICH. L. REV. 479 (1927); Hull
"The Regulation of Water Carriers,'' 66 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 95 (1918); HUTCHINSON, CARRIERS, 3d ed. (1906); Donrn, BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS (1914).
24 See dissenting opinion of Justice Black in Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New
York Tank Barge Corp., 314 U.S. 104, 62 S. Ct. 156 (1941).
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proving seaworthiness followed the carrier regardless of his status.25
As Justice Black aptly remarked:
"I have found no language in the opinions of this Court, in
cases holding the burden of proof of seaworthiness rests upon a
common carrier, that even suggests, not to say compels, the inference that a di:fferent result would have been reached if the carrier
had.been a private one." 26
Perhaps even more indicative of the Court's early attitude is the fa~
that numerous decisions were rendered without the slightest consideration being given to whether a common or private carrier was involved,
apparently upon the theory that it was of no consequence.21
The case of The Edwin I. Morrison, 28 which until recently at least
was considered of the highest authority, is representative of this general period. The libellant here sought to recover from a private carrier for injuries to his cargo caused by the breaking away of the cap
from one of the bilge-pump holes and the consequent taking of water
through the gap left in the side of the vessel. Being unable to determine whether the loss could be attributed to a peril of the sea excepted
in the bill of lading or to the unseaworthy condition of the vessel, the
Court was compelled to sustain a verdict for the shipper on the ground
that the burden of proof was upon the shipowner to show that the
vessel was seaworthy. "It was for them to show affirmatively the safety
of the cap and plate; and that they were carried away by extraordinary
contingencies, not reasonably to have been anticipated." 29 Again in
The John Twohy so similar facts produced a similarity in treatment
when the court used this language:
·
" ... There was nothing in the charter-party limiting this obligation [ of seaworthiness]. Therefore the burden of affirmatively
25 The Warren Adams, {C.C.A. 2d, 1896) 74 F. 413; Rich v. Lambert, 12
How. (53 U.S.) 347 {1851); Nelson v. Woodruff, I Black (66 U.S.) 156 (1862);
The Majestic, 166 U.S. '375, 17 S. Ct. 597 {1897); The Lydian Monarch,
(D. C. N. J. 1885) 23 F. 298; The Mascotte, (C. C. A. 2d, 1892) 51 F. 605. For
Supreme Court developments, see The Edwin I. Morrison, 153 U.S. 199, 14 S. Ct.
823 {1894); The Southwark, 191 U.S. 1, 24 S. Ct. I (1903); The Folmina, 212
U. S. 35~ 29 S. Ct. 363 (1909); Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank
Barge Corp., 314 U.S. 104, 62 S. Ct. 156 (1941).
26 Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank Barge Corp., 314 U.S. 104
at u6, 62 S. Ct. 156 (1941).
27 The Edwin I. Morrison, 153 U.S. 199, 14 S. Ct. 823 {1894); The John
'I\vohy, (C. C. A. 3d, 1922) 279 F. 343; The Folmina, 212 U. 6. 354, 29 S. Ct.
363 (1909).
28 153 U.S. 199, 14 S. Ct. 823 (1894).
29 Id., 153 U.S. at 2II.
30 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922) 279 F. 343.
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proving her seaworthiness at the commencement of the voyage, as
well as sustaining the defense that the damage to the cargo was
due to perils of the sea within exceptions of the charter-party and
bill-of-lading, rests upon the owners." 31
Tested by the rules formulated in the Commercial Molasses Corporation case, it is apparent that both of these cases, along with a host
of satellites, are diametrically inconsistent with the present law concerning carriers. Several grounds for reconciliation have been suggested,
but they would probably foster more confusion than is justified by the
comfortable consistency thereby achieved. 32 It is far more realistic to
recognize that new principles for distributing the burdens and presumptions of evidence are being worked out by the courts, and consequently many, if not all, of these older authorities have been overruled.
One of the first indications of this process is found in S. C. Loveland Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co. 33 Here the evidence was such that the
loss could not definitely be attributed either to the negligence of the
personnel or to the unseaworthy condition of the vessel, hence the sole
question involved a proper allocation of the burden of proof. In its
opinion the court, superficially at least, adopts a theory identical with
that employed in the Commercial Molasses Corporation case, and recognizes that since the respondents had merely undertaken the obligations of a private carrier or bailee for hire, the burden lay upon the
petitioners, and after the shipper sh-0ws that the accident occurred
without known cause there then arose a presumption of unseaworthiness. which must be met "before any question of ·negligence would
arise.m 4 The similarity between the two cases is more apparent than
real, however, and it ends where a practical application of the doctrines
expressed in each case begins. For example, in the Bethlehem case the
word "presumption" is used as practically synonymous with the term
31 ld. 344. See also, The Folmina, 212 U.S. 354 at 363, 29 S. Ct. 363 (1909),
where the Court said: "As the burden of showing that the damage arose from one
of the excepted causes was upon the carrier, and the evidence, although establishing
the damage, left its efficient cause wholly unascertained, it follows that the doubt as
to the cause of the entrance of the sea water must be resolved against the carrier."
32 For those who desire consistency, there are two possible grounds of reconciliation: (a) that the Court uses the term "burden of proof" indiscriminately, and in
effect, meant "burden of going forward with the evidence," which is closely akin
to saying that a presumption created, a prima facie case for the cargo-owner which the
ship owner was unable to meet; or (b) that contracting to redeliver "in good order
and condition" was an assumption of the obligations of a common carrier. In the light
of the Court's approach, neither of these seems an acceptable conclusion, although the
latter is adopted in the Commercial :Molasses Corporation case.
33 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929) 33 F. (2d) 655.
84 Supra, note 20.
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"burden of proof." When the respondent offered to produce sufficient
evidence to create a doubt as to the cause of the loss, the court denied
that this would be sufficient, saying:
" ... A party rebutting the presumption must show affirmatively that the damage was caused by a peril of the sea or other
things excepted by the contract of affreightment and cannot absolve himself from blame by merely showing such a state of facts
that the court is unable to discover how the disaster occurred, or
that it might have occurred from something which, if only it were
known, is a peril of the sea." 35
It is difficult to see how this holding differs actually from the Morrison
case, in spite of the varied theories under which the two courts have
worked out the problem. In each case the shipowner is required to
show "affirmatively" that the loss was not due to the unseaworthy condition of his vessel. One court achieves this by fixing the burden of
proof upon the shipowner, the other by calling it a presumption, yet
in each case the amount of proof required to overcome the disability is
the same.
These cases illustrate rather well the type of confusion which has
prevailed in this field. Much of it is undoubtedly due to an indiscriminate use of the terms "presumption," "burden of proof," and
"burden of going forward with the evidence," which, as Professor
Wigmore has pointed out, is by no means uncommon. 86 Beyond this,
however, they indicate a failure on the part of some courts to distinguish between an absolute warranty and the burden of proof in respect
to that warranty. As indicated at the outset, the common and private
carriers are in no different position in regard to the extent of their
assurances. Both absolutely warrant that their vessel is seaworthy and
neither is excused by showing himself free from negligence or knowledge of latent defects. Apparently the adamant nature of this obligation has induced judges to assume that it alone allocates the burdens
to the shipowners. Actually this proposition is extremely doubtful,
since it is generally recognized that the rules of pleading and of evidence, determined by considerations of policy or expediency, and not
any warranties undertaken, fix the burden upon one contestant or the
other.
The Commercial Molasses Corporation case, representing as it does
the last stage in this evolution, has proved instrumental in clarifying
many confusing aspects of earlier decisions, particularly in regard to
the use of such terms as "burden of proof," "prima facie," "presump35
35

33 F. (2d) at 657.
9 WIGMORE, EvmENcE, 3d ed., §§ 2483-2496 (1940).
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tion," and "burden of going forward with the evidence." 37 While it
is beyond the scope of this paper to undertake any detailed survey of
the meaning of these terms, it is important to note briefly the difference
in effect between burden of proof and presumption, since not infrequently this constitutes the very essence of our problem. Both indicate
the imposition of a duty, upon one of the contestants which requires
that he come forward with additional evidence or suffer the consequences; yet the amount of proof required to overcome the one will
vary considerably from that required to overcome the other. For
example, one can avoid the consequences of the presumption of un. seaworthiness merely by creating a doubt as to whether the vessel sank
from an inherent defect in the ship itself or from a peril of the sea
excepted in the bill of lading, but in order to satisfy the burden of
proof one must show affirmatively that she did in fact sink because of a
peril of the sea. The relative advantage of one disability over the
other is manifest, especially in eases where the evidence is meager.

4.
Proceeding now to a consideration of the theory underlying the
rules applicable in allocating the burden of proving seaworthiness,
there is entirely lacking any satisfactory reason for distinguishing between a common and private·carrier. Apparently the foundation of our
law in this respect is rooted more in history than in logic; yet how, in
the beginning, these principles developed is still and probably will
remain shrouded in obscurity. Many legal scholars are in agreement,
however, that the first authoritative reason for this ·differential treatment accorded common ·carriers was gathered from the pre-existing
law by Justice Holt in Coggs v. Bernard.38
" ... The law charges this person thus entrusted to carry
goods, against all events but acts of God, and of the enemies of the
37 When the ·courts speak of the "burden of proof," they mean simply that unless
the contestant upon whom the burden rests is able to convince the judge or jury of
the essential facts of his case he will lose. The term "burden of going forward with
the evidence" explains a situation which exists when one party has adduced sufficient
evidence that if unshaken would weigh the scales in his favor; then in order to pass
the judge, the other party must come forward with additional evidence to offset _that
of his adversary and bring the scales back into equilibrium. The word "presumption"
is used to mean a situation where certain facts forming a part of the issue are inferrable
from specific evidence introduced by one contestant. See 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3rd
ed., §§ 2490-2493 ( I 940) •
38 2 Ld. Raym. 909 at 918, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (1703). This case is discussed in
Mercer v. Christiana Ferry Co., 4 W. W. Harr. (34 Del.) 490, 155 A. 596 (1930);
Hart, "The Liability of Shipowners at Common Law," 5 L. Q. REV. 15 (188<});
'Goddard, "The Liability of the Common Carrier," 15 CoL. L. REV. 39<}, 475 (I<}I5);
Beale, "The Carrier's Liability: Its History," II HARV. L. REv. 158 (1897).
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King. For though the force be never so great, as if an irresistible
multitude of people should rob him, nevertheless he is chargeable.
And this is a politick establishment, contrived by the policy of the
law, for the safety of all persons, the necessity of whose affairs
obliges them to trust these sorts of persons, that they may be safe
in their ways of dealing; for else these carriers might have an
opportunity for undoing all persons that had any dealings with
them, by combining with thieves, &c., and yet doing it in such a
clandestine manner, as would not be possible to be discovered."
While the force of this "politick" reason is largely dissipated today,
the rule herein perpetuated has descended to us with but minor variations and with virtually no dissenting voices. This rule had already
been applied to carriers of goods by sea in Mors v. Slew,8° holding the
shipmaster liable where goods were stolen from the ship through no
negligence on his part. Translated into terms of pleading and evidence,
this so-called "insurer's liability" is a shorthand expression of the fact
that the common carrier must be prepared to sustain the burden of
proof while the private carrier is subject to no corresponding obligation. The common law did not question the social utility of this view,
yet, curiously enough, it was never extended to the point of relieving
the private carrier from the burden of proving seaworthiness. In this
respect, at least, the common and the private carriers were under identical obligations. Therefore, the majority opinion in the Comm,ercial
Molasses Corporation case that, except for this extraordinary liability
the common carrier would be excused from sustaining the burden,
seems without foundation in fact. The reason there was obviously contrived to fit a conclusion already made.
The basis generally given and most widely accepted as the reason
for the common carrier's different treatment is stated in Schnell v. Tlie
Vallescura: 40
". . . The reason for the rule is apparent. He is a bailee entrusted with the shipper's goods, with respect to the care and safe
delivery of which the law imposes upon him an extraordinary
duty. Discharge of the duty is peculiarly within his control. All
the facts and circumstances upon which he may rely to relieve him
of that duty are peculiarly within his knowledge and usually unknown to the shipper. In consequence, the law casts upon him
the burden of the loss which he cannot explain or, explaining,
bring within the exceptional case in which he is relieved from
liability."
89
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2 Keh. 866, 3 Keh. 72, II2, 135, 84 Eng. Rep. 548, 601, 624, 638 (1671).
293 U.S. 296 at 304, 55 S. Ct. 194 (1934).
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This is undoubtedly a compelling reason for fixing the burden of
proving seaworthiness upon both common and private carriers, but it is
hardly a satisfactory basis for distinguishing between a common and a
private carrier since, whichever it be, the shipper, normally having no
representative on board, is likely to encounter equal difficulties in producing the actual evidence. The reason behind the rule being arbitrary,
we are assured of failure if we try to work out any logical basis for the
court's action. Perhaps, if we adopt the analysis of Justice Holmes, the
change worked out in the Commercial Molasses Corporation case represents a further deviation from the "insurer's" liability which was
originally imposed upon all bailees regardless of their status.41 Perhaps
the trend today is towards a mitigation of strict liability upon all
bailees.

5.
The private carrier, however, has not been relieved of all obligation, since in determining whether the owner has sustained his burden,
the courts are disposed to take into account the relative opportunity of
each party to ascertain the facts. Generally the bailee is in a better
position to know the circumstances than the bailor; therefore, the law
compensates this initial advantage by imposing upon the bailee the
duty of bringing into court the information available to him. A failure
to satisfy this requirement will have an effect similar to that of res ipsa
loquitur. It leaves the trier of fact free to conclude that ,the evidence
neglected by the bailee would be harmful to his cause. In the Commercial Molasses Corporation case, the Court refers to this doctrine in
these words:
"Whether we label this permissible inference with the equivocal term 'presumption' or consider merely that it is a rational
inference from the facts proven, it does no more than require
the bailee, if he would avoid the inference, to go forward with
evidence sufficient to persuade that the non-existence of the fact,
which would otherwise be inferred, is as probable as its existence.
It does not cause the burden of proof to shift, and if the bailee
does go forward with the evidence enough to raise doubts as to the
vailidity of the inference, which the trier of fact is unable to
resolve, the bailor does not sustain the burden of persuasion which
41

HoLMEs, THE CoMMON LAW 180 (1881). Justice Holmes adopts the theory
that originally all bailees were absolutely liable; that consequently Coggs v. Bernard,
2 Ld. Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (1703), represents a mitigation of this liability.
For opinion contra, see JoNES, BAILMENTS, 3d London ed., 103 ( 1828). See also
Goddard, "The Liability of the Common Carrier," 15 CoL. L. REv. 399, 475
(1915).
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upon the whole evidence remains upon him, where it rested at the
start." 42
It is difficult to see in what respects a presumption can adversely
affect the position of the common carrier, since it has no probative
value, and since the carrier must sustain the burden of proof in any
event. That is to say, the duties imposed upon a contestant by the
burden of proof include and are greater than any duties imposed upon
him by a presumption. Therefore, much confusion would be eliminated if the term were not used in connection with the general ship.
To the private shipowner, however, a presumption is undoubtedly a
patent factor weighing the scales in favor of his adversary by imposing
on him a duty he would not otherwise have and thereby compensating
his initial advantage over the shipper.
A few examples of how certain presumptions arise have already
been called to our attention, but there are also numerous others based
on evidential facts "that keep recurring scores or hundreds of times,
from which experience shows that inferences may safely be made as
to other essential facts when nothing appears to the contrary." 48 For
example, by the authority of the Commercial Molasses Corporation
case, where a vessel sinks in smooth water without evident cause, there
arises a presumption that the vessel was unseaworthy at the outset,
because experience in maritime practice justifies such an inference. Or,
as in The Warren Adams,44 ''Where a vessel, soon after leaving port,
becomes leaky, without stress of weather, or other adequate cause of
injury, the presumption is that she was unsound before setting sail."
These and many other similar presumptions, supposedly based on experience in litigated affairs, serve to aid the process of proof where, as
is often the case, specific evidence is not available or where the requirement to adduce it would work a needless hardship.
The new principles under which the courts are now able to distribute the burden of proving seaworthiness are not difficult or complicated in theory; yet it is manifest that in order fully to appreciate
their possible consequences, a working knowledge of admiralty courts
in actual operation is necessary. It seems to be true here, as elsewhere,
that a slight variation in theory may and often does result in a many
times greater variation in practice. For example, by the theory expressed in the Commercial Molasses Corporation case, the private
42 Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank Barge Corp., 314 U.S. 104
at 111, 62 S. Ct. 156 (1941). See 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed.,§§ 2483-2496
(1940).
48 WIGMORE, A STUDENTS' TEXTBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 444, p.
441 (1935).
0 (C. C. A. 2d, 1896) 74 F. 413 at 415-416.
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carrier's obligation to sustain the burden of proving seaworthiness has
been reduced to an obligation to overcome, in all cases where the
evidence is uncertain, a presumption of unseaworthiness. Or, in other
words, where the carrier was once required to convince the judge
"affirmatively" of the seaworthy condition of his vessel, he is now
only required to raise ~ doubt as to the existence of the facts "which
would otherwise be inferred" against him. At first glance, this exchange of obligations does not appear to have materially improved
the position of the priv~te carrier, yet it seems most probable that in
actual practice numerous cases will be won because of this factor alone.
Doubt and conviction represent "two contrasting states of mind in
_which a person may fin.d himself when action is proposed to him." 45
Action is usually the result of conviction, while doubt leads to inaction.
The relative disadvantage of having to convince the tribunal of your
cause before it is willing to take action in your favor is obvious. Unfortunately little of this practical process finds its way into the recorded
cases; rather it remains secluded and inaccessible in the minds of
judges. Consequently, it is almost impossible to form an accurate
appraisal of the changes introduced by the Commercial Molasses
Corporation case until further evidence of these doctrines in actual
operation is accumulated.
·
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